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 1 Introduction
The literature on ﬁnance1 and economic growth has experienced a renaissance in the last ﬁfteen
years. The construction of a large World Bank dataset covering the second half of the twentieth
century facilitated a large number of cross-country studies. While most of this work supports the
hypothesis that ﬁnance plays a determining factor in economic growth, there have been one or two
voices urging a more cautious interpretation of the data.
At the same time as creating new opportunities for research, it has engendered a, perhaps
excessive, focus on cross-sectional results based on ﬁnancial depth alone. Recognising this, some
economic historians (inter alia Rousseau and Sylla, 2004) have begun constructing datasets to
reveal the time-series experience of countries going through a period of industrial and ﬁnancial
revolution. However, the time-series data remain somewhat sparse and, in general, the implications
of the literature in terms of growth and transition over time has been largely neglected.
The theory of ﬁnance and growth has been developed, almost in parallel to the cross-section
empirics, toexplainwhyﬁnancemaycausegrowth. Ithasbeendemonstratedthat, inacomparative
sense, ﬁnancial institutions can play a role in the level of sustained growth. There is here, however,
no clear quantitative lesson to be drawn from the existing literature; yet modern macroeconomic
theory is judged largely against its ability to be calibrated by and replicate data in a consistent way.
Many theoretical considerations of the ﬁnance-growth nexus do not rigorously confront theory
with data. By adapting the core mechanics of some key theories, we present in this paper a simple
and representative model of ﬁnance and growth that can aid numerical understanding.
We begin to survey those aspects of the literature on the ﬁnance-growth nexus which are not
covered in orthodox surveys of the subject, such as Levine (2005). The central thesis of this survey
regards the coherence of the various aspects of the ﬁnance-growth nexus. We argue that growth the-
oryandgrowthempiricshavebecomedisconnected, especiallyinrelationtothequestionofﬁnance
and growth; in an important sense, they answer different questions. In addition, we demonstrate
that both theory and empirics can learn from cliometric evidence and we give a concrete example
of just where this reconnection with history may be most fruitful.
1Throughout, we use the word ‘ﬁnance’ in the same general sense in which it is interpreted in the literature: Everything
from the microeconomic relationships between ﬁnancial institutions and the agents (both debtors and creditors) demanding
their services to macroeconomic aggregates such as ratios of ﬁnancial debt to national output.
2The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 surveys the current state of knowledge in empir-
ical, historical and theoretical terms. This analysis feeds directly into Section 3, which presents a
simple model that captures some core mechanics and allows us to survey quantitatively the impli-
cations of the theory. Armed with an understanding of the numerics of both applied and theoretical
work, Section 4 considers the potential for future research on ﬁnance and growth to be more fully




King and Levine (1993a,b) were among the ﬁrst to demonstrate the potential for panel datasets
such as Beck et al. (1999) and its precursors to make rigorous the ﬁnance and growth debate.
King and Levine found not only a consistent contemporaneous relationship between aggregate
measures of ﬁnancial depth and growth, but also a strong predictive component. They argue that
current ﬁnancial depth can predict economic growth over the consequent ten to thirty years and
concludethat“betterﬁnancialsystemsstimulatefasterproductivitygrowthandgrowthinpercapita
output by funneling society’s resources to promising productivity-enhancing endeavours.” (King
and Levine, 1993b, p. 540.)
In addition, Levine et al. (2000) address the obvious endogeneity problems inherent in ﬁnance
and growth regressions. Demirg¨ uc ¸-Kunt and Levine (2001) cover a great deal of empirical work
using a number of different econometric techniques on datasets ranging from micro-level ﬁrm data
to international comparative studies. These studies, and many others besides, ﬁnd support for the
argument that ﬁnance leads growth, in some sense.
There have been some questions raised, by inter alia Drifﬁll (2003), about the interpretation of
empirical results like those outlined above. These concerns have been omitted from surveys such
as Levine (2005), so we pay special attention to them here. Indeed, on further analysis, we suggest
that the impact of data limitations may be more acute than is generally believed. It will be argued
that these limitations have the tendency to exaggerate the role of ﬁnance in determining economic
3growth.
The World Bank dataset, while currently covering the period 1960-2003 for 192 countries,2 is
not complete for all countries. For example, consider a preferred measure of ﬁnancial interme-
diation, the private credit-to-GDP ratio: The mean average number of observations per country
is 24.1. As such, a typical cross-sectional estimation necessarily involves an average of ﬁnancial
variables over a long period, often over the whole sample period. Some empirical work has begun
to use panel data (inter alia Levine et al., 2000), but the longitudinal scope of the panels used is
limited (in the case of Levine et al., the panel consists of ﬁve seven-year averages over the period
1960-95) and this depth comes at the cost of cross-sectional breadth (Levine et al. include only
71 countries from a total sample of nearly 150 at that time). Not only is it hard to think about ﬁ-
nance leading growth when the averaging time periods are so long, but such a trade-off also leaves
estimations open to selection bias issues.
A number of speciﬁc results, obtained using this dataset, have been called into question. Drifﬁll
(2003) and Manning (2002) argue that the results in Levine and Zervos (1998) have implausible
implications for the effect of ﬁnancial development on growth. Speciﬁcally, the results suggest a
one-percent per annum increase in growth rates could be obtained if developing countries increased
the level of ﬁnancial development to those of more successful countries. He demonstrates that a
number of results hinge on the inclusion of outliers, while the inclusion of regional dummies, espe-
cially those for the Asian Tigers, also renders coefﬁcients on ﬁnancial development insigniﬁcant.
Drifﬁll goes on to consider the robustness of the work on industry-level data of Rajan and Zingales
(1998). It is shown again that the positive effect of ﬁnancial development on growth is contingent
upon the speciﬁcation employed, particularly that including broad regional dummies tends to neu-
tralise the signiﬁcance of ﬁnancial variables. Drifﬁll concludes that the positive results on data over
this period were likely driven by the growth of the Asian Tigers, growth which is more naturally
attributed to other factors (on this see inter alia Young, 1995; Rodrik, 1996; Landes, 1998).
With this in mind, it should be noted that the Levine et al. (2000) dataset ends in 1995, before
the Asian ﬁnancial crisis; a period of economic downturn preceded by deepening ﬁnancial markets.
Financial depth, as measured by Levine et al.’s preferred indicator of ﬁnancial depth (the ratio of
private credit-to-GDP), increased signiﬁcantly in the Asian Tiger countries over the period 1992-
2The dataset is available from http://econ.worldbank.org/. We refer to the March 14 2005 revision here.
41998: In China by 30.9%; Hong Kong, 40.3%; Indonesia, 21.9%; the Korean Republic, 53.8%;
Malaysia, 45.7%; the Philippines, 142.9%; and Thailand, 89.3%. The year 1998 saw a reduction
in GDP in all of these countries except China (the respective percent changes in real GDP per
capita were: 5.35; -8.21; -11.6; -9.08; -0.62; -4.06; -10.74).3 While it is, of course, not possible
to draw any hard conclusions from such analysis, if Drifﬁll (2003) is correct in suggesting that
most of the signiﬁcance of ﬁnancial variables is driven by the growth experience of the Asian
Tigers, then this episode calls for a more reﬁned classiﬁcation of ﬁnancial depth. A measure which
controls for both institutional and regulatory factors that might determine the efﬁcacy of ﬁnancial
deepening in spurring growth may obtain very different results.4 Additionally, a distinction in
growth regressions between foreign and domestic providers of ﬁnance may provide more qualiﬁed
results.
Aghion et al. (2005) use the same 1960-95 dataset as Levine et al. (2000). They also include
the same 71 countries despite using the dataset in a purely cross-sectional way (employing an
average of the private credit variable over the entire thirty-ﬁve-year period) to demonstrate the
positive effect of ﬁnancial development on convergence. It is possible that their results would be
very different if we re-estimated on the whole sample, increasing both the number of countries and
the endpoint to include properly the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. While Aghion et al. (2005) do test for
some geographical differences, they do not test speciﬁcally for the East Asian bloc.
The potential signiﬁcance of selection bias issues is here even more important since Aghion
et al. take an average for their ﬁnancial proxy over the whole sample period. Countries with
available data are more likely to have converged (for example the sample includes only 11 of 54
African countries) and countries with sparse data are generally those that were poor in 1960, such
that available data tends to be at the end of the sample, as can be seen in Figure 1.
Added to this, the trend of ﬁnancial development as measured by the credit-to-GDP ratio is
itself rising over time across countries. This can be seen by inspection of the data: The credit-to-
GDP ratio trends upwards in around 55 of the 71 countries in the sample. As such, the measure of
ﬁnancial development for countries who were relatively poor in 1960 and so with data for only the
3This data is from the Penn World Table, see Heston et al. (2002).
4There has recently been a move to consider institutional and legal issues, see particularly Levine (2004) and Beck and
Levine (2005).
5Figure 1: Distribution of Missing Observations for the Private Credit-to-GDP Ratio in the Levine et
al. (2000) Dataset
later years, is biased upwards relative to a rich country with data for every year.5
The combination of these factors – the long average, the data sparsity, the sample selection bias
and the upward trend in the ﬁnancial development indicator selected – means that those countries
that did converge have, as a result of the methods used, necessarily had a higher measure of ﬁnan-
cial development over the period. This would explain, at least partly, why the results in Aghion
et al. (2005) are so robust to alternate speciﬁcations. This critique is, unfortunately, not speciﬁc to
the Aghion et al. paper; see Beck et al. (2004, p.9): “...we sometimes use data averaged over the
period 1960-1999, and sometimes we use data over the period 1980-2000...”.
It should be clear that one ought not to be overly reliant on either purely cross-sectional em-
pirics or limited panel datasets. Drifﬁll, op cit, suggests a greater emphasis on long-run, historical
time-series. He stresses in particular the importance of comparing countries at similar stages of
development in order that more robust conclusions might be drawn.
The overall message from contemporary empirical research on ﬁnance and growth is indica-
5It should be noted that the upward trend is not speciﬁc to the credit-to-GDP ratio; two of the three alternative proxies
used in Aghion et al. (2005, Table 4), trend upwards. The third, a ratio of commercial bank to central bank assets,
is relatively stable for most countries over the period, and this is the one proxy for which the coefﬁcient on ﬁnancial
development is insigniﬁcant.
6tive but problematic; time-series evidence must be consolidated in order that we can speak of the
relation between ﬁnancial institutions and growth within a country over a period of transition with
conﬁdence.
2.2 Theories of Finance and Growth
Theoretical models of the ﬁnance-growth nexus generally differ along three aspects: The type of
endogenous growth; the ﬁnance mechanism; and the treatment of asymmetric information. Us-
ing this structure, Table 1 outlines the main features of some of the most inﬂuential ﬁnance and
endogenous growth models. It should be clear by inspection that, regardless of the source of en-
dogenous growth, the main feature determining growth in most models is some ﬁnancial constraint
on the acquisition of either knowledge via education or technology via entrepreneurship.
[Table 1 about here.]
Financial intermediation in most models takes the form of a perfectly competitive banking
system. Some consider a role for stock markets, but often only as a choice between mutually-
exclusive banks and markets (such as Greenwood and Smith, 1997). Blackburn et al. (2005) is
an interesting exception, and considers both the joint-determination and co-existence of banks and
stock markets as determined by state-dependent moral hazard conditions. In these models there
is feedback from growth in the economy to the determination of optimal ﬁnancial structure, be it
based on banking alone or on a mixture of banks and markets. As an economy develops so it can
afford those ﬁnancial structures that better facilitate faster growth (Greenwood and Smith, op cit).
In a related literature, multiple equilibria can emerge as a result of countries with limited ﬁnan-
cial sectors caught in a low-growth trap. Saint-Paul (1992) is a further approach to the modelling
of stock markets, wherein stock markets that facilitate international risk sharing enable specialisa-
tion in technologies and higher growth. There is thus a low- (high-)growth equilibrium associated
with low (high) ﬁnancial development, capturing the idea of different take-off points for industri-
alising nations. In Bose and Cothren (1996) a bank lends to an entrepreneur of unknown quality
and selects by either designing a separating menu contract (where this is possible) or by imple-
menting a costly screening technology, or by a mix of the two. They show that in the early stages
of ﬁnancial development, a fall in the screening cost can actually be growth-reducing because of
7the interaction between dependence on rationing or screening. In concurrence with Schumpeter,
the ﬁnancial sector needs to reach ‘critical mass’ before advances in ﬁnancial sophistication will
improve growth.
The majority of works outlined in Table 1 treat the ﬁnancial sector as static (where the nature
of the relationship between agents and intermediaries does not change endogenously over time;
again, Blackburn et al., 2005, is a notable exception), with the degree of efﬁciency of identify-
ing/screening/funding/monitoring suitable debtors determining the costs of ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion and so the level of economic growth. Most consider some form of entrepreneur who cannot
or will not personally fund a project either because it is too large or too risky. Increasing the ease
with which entrepreneurs can obtain funds thus increases the rate of technological progress and so
the rate of economic growth. Others consider a role for the accumulation of education or human
capital as entering directly into the production function; the efﬁciency with which this process is
facilitated by screening or funding agents thus has an effect on economic growth. Further papers
look at the effect of credit constraints on entrepreneurship and, again, the consequence of higher
efﬁciency in ﬁnancial intermediation for growth are, for all intents and purposes, equivalent.
The major differences between these models largely revolve around the treatment of asym-
metric information. In a few (King and Levine, 1993b; Bose and Cothren, 1996; inter alia) the
information problem is relatively straightforward, wherein asymmetric information plays a role in
pre-contracting, i.e., wherethereisadverseselection, andintermediariesareendowedwiththeabil-
ity to screen heterogeneous agents. Agent behaviour post-contracting in these models is not subject
to asymmetric information. In others (such as de la De la Fuente and Mar´ ın, 1996; Blackburn and
Hung, 1998; Morales, 2003; Aghion et al., 2005; inter alia) there is a post-contract incentive for
agents to shirk or deceive because of, respectively, an aversion to effort or an ability to hide re-
search outcomes. Such moral hazard issues thus bring the modelling of static intermediation closer
to reality, but often simply add another wedge between agents and ﬁrms, scaling up intermediation
costs and so, ceteris paribus, scaling down balanced growth rates.
The implications for policy in these models is, in general, limited to advocating liberalised
ﬁnancial markets and efforts to increase the efﬁciency of banks and markets while providing the
institutional support required to diminish the costs of moral hazard and enforce contracts. The
book by Rajan and Zingales (2004) is a prominent example of the sorts of policy prescriptions
8derived from this literature. In terms of theory, King and Levine (1993b) show that a simple tax on
income from ﬁnancial intermediation will have a monotonic effect on the level of intermediation
and so on growth. An interesting result is that of Morales (2003), where effort-averse entrepreneurs
with limited liability can be inﬂuenced by being subject to bank monitoring. It is shown that,
under certain conditions, it is possible that a research subsidy (one direct to the entrepreneur) will
accentuate the moral hazard problem and actually reduce growth. It is suggested, therefore, that
policy used to stimulate growth should concentrate on ﬁnancial intermediation and that the optimal
tax on research can be non-zero.
In short, the theory reviewed brieﬂy here suggests that greater ﬁnancial efﬁciency (be it in
providing insurance, pooling resources, screening entrepreneurs or monitoring borrowers) reduces
the disincentive to entrepreneurship or the accumulation of human capital, thus increasing the rate
of technological progress and consequently also the long-run growth rate of the economy. A key
component missing from most of these models is a consideration of their quantitative implications.
For a comparison between these literatures to take place, we develop in section 3 a stylised model
of ﬁnance and growth in the spirit of those surveyed here and and draw out the implications for
time-series growth in the UK.
However, ﬁrst we turn to the historical literature and consider the potential for cliometric evi-
dence to enter into the ﬁnance-growth debate.
2.3 Historical Evidence
Historical and cliometric research can have a lot to add to our understanding of any subject. If our
goal is to answer questions about the necessary preconditions for developing countries to enter a
sustained period of higher growth, cross-section analysis of developed countries or theories based
on a static intermediation problem can only aid us in a limited way. It is clear that the onus on
establishing more rigorous empirical evidence will lead to much fruitful historical research, and
a few papers have already begun in this direction. A consideration of the relationship between
ﬁnance and growth in countries going through a period of transition might tell us more about the
dynamics at play. Were there important changes, for example, in the way in which agents raised
ﬁnance over time? Did legislation inhibit the emergence of the ﬁnancial sector? Why, and how, do
9different ﬁnancial structures emerge? Why did the UK industrialise ﬁrst, despite not being the ﬁrst
to develop a sophisticated banking system? Are there any cliometric tests which we could impose
on theoretical models of ﬁnance and growth?
Rousseau and Sylla (2005) combine a long historical US dataset (covering the initial emer-
gence of the ﬁnancial structure we see today, over the period 1790-1850) with contemporary dy-
namic econometric techniques. They argue that initial ﬁnancial developments “placed the United
States of the early 19th century on a trajectory of economic growth higher than that of other na-
tions... The US ﬁnancial system did (and does) what a modern ﬁnancial system is supposed to do,
namely mobilize and efﬁciently allocate capital, and provide opportunities for risk management”
(Rousseau and Sylla, 2005, p. 21). Additional moves to present the empirics of ﬁnance and growth
in an historical context include Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) and Wright (2004).
Bordo and Rousseau (2006) follow Rousseau and Sylla (2005) and embark upon a long-run
analysis of the ﬁnance-growth link, and move to consider what they term ‘deeper fundamentals’.
Considering a number of case-study countries, again on a aggregate basis, they add parameters for
legal origin (intended to capture a country’s inherent attitude to property and contract rights), the
political environment and other factors into regressions on ﬁnance and growth. Conclusions from
this analysis are not clear since, “...there remains a substantial component of ﬁnancial development
that is correlated with growth and yet not related to these measures of deeper fundamentals.” (p.26).
We wish for empirical analysis of both contemporary and historical data to enter into decisions
made about the nature of a stylised theory of ﬁnance and growth. The historical research, out of
necessity, considers aggregate ﬁnancial depth. But the ﬁnding that ﬁnancial depth led periods of
sustained growth in a number of countries does not mean that increasing ﬁnancial efﬁciency by
cutting down on moral hazard and adverse selection will do so also.6
So cliometric analyses of the type outlined above cannot, by themselves, support theories based
around information and the efﬁciency of intermediation. To do so would need a detailed consid-
eration of the ways in which banks and markets emerged: An analysis of the role of asymmetric
information and entrepreneurship in forming the ﬁnancial structures observed around the period
of industrial revolution, and not just of aggregate measures of ﬁnancial depth. Large, national
6A novel and highly interesting exception, slightly out of place in this analysis, is that of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996),
which demonstrates that bank liberalisation in the US increased economic growth for efﬁciency, rather than depth, reasons.
10ﬁnancial institutions did not appear overnight but were the response to economic incentives that
emergedovertime, buildingtheﬁnancialstructuresweseetodayfrominformalcoalitionsofagents
that saw the initial incentives to act as intermediaries.
Some more normative historical research has approached these considerations in the context
of ﬁnance and growth. Wright (2002) provides some evidence to support the mechanisms through
which ﬁnancial institutions can facilitate economic growth by compensating for asymmetric in-
formation conditions, and so backs-up both the empirical evidence in favour of the ﬁnance-led
growth hypothesis and the dominant theoretical models. As Wright (p.212) notes, “Problems of
information asymmetry, namely adverse selection, moral hazard, and the principal-agent problem,
collude to limit effective lending.” The author suggests that the early US ﬁnancial system was in
fact much more effective than previously believed, and invokes Adam Smith as being among the
ﬁrst to describe the ways in which banks spur growth by addressing information problems. The
central part that asymmetric information plays in determining the efﬁcacy of ﬁnancial institutions
in engendering sustained levels of high economic growth is the central message of this work.
But such analysis does not get to the question of whether such ﬁnancial structures emerge as a
result of economic necessity or whether economic growth, and industrial take-off, can actually be
forestalled by an inadequate ﬁnancial system with the implication that an exogenous improvement
in the ﬁnancial environment will facilitate takeoff. The broader historical consensus on UK growth
isthattheroleofﬁnanceindeterminingindustrialdevelopmentwasatbestlimited. Cottrell(1980),
Harris(2000), Shea(2005), andothers, citeboththeeasewithwhichaﬁrmcouldﬁndinitialﬁnance
and the ubiquity of proﬁt-ploughback as a means of expansion. It is also shown that a great deal of
early ﬁnancial intermediation was decentralised, where often the regional manufacturing industries
opted for local ﬁnance and not the use of the London capital markets (on this see inter alia Pollins,
1954; Milward and Saul, 1973; Cottrell, 1980; Turnbull, 1987; Harris, 2000). Depicting only
the growth of a national ﬁnancial system thus masks a great deal of complexity and dynamism
regarding the relationship between entrepreneurs and ﬁnancial intermediaries.
113 A Representative Model of Finance and Growth
The purpose of this section is to outline a simple version of an endogenous growth model that can
capture the principle mechanics of signiﬁcant theoretical works. It also reﬂects in part the historical
debateonthenatureofasymmetricinformation, bothintermsofadverseselectionandanextension
to include moral hazard. We calibrate the model to historical data for the UK and so trace out the
implied ‘transition path’ for ﬁnancial efﬁciency over the period of the industrial revolution. We feel
that by developing a representative model that can generate numerical implications for ﬁnance and
growth aids the survey in three ways: It provides intuition about the mechanics of typical models;
it generates a means to test the quantitative implications of the theory against the data; and, it helps
us to consider the theory in an applied historical context.
Since the majority of the literature considers ﬁnancial intermediation in the form of banking
we will consider that alone. We will also take the relationship to be static, i.e., the way in which
intermediaries and agents interact does not explicitly change over time. In addition, we assume that
therearenoarbitrarycreditconstraintssothatthecausesoffrictionareentirelyinformational. With
a suitable model we can thus use numerical methods to compare quantitatively the implications of
such models for time-series growth with the historical pattern of industrial ﬁnance and growth.
The mechanism by which ﬁnance affects long-run growth follows the trend suggested by Table
1, as well as the historical discussion of Wright (2002): Ever since King and Levine (1993b), theo-
ries of ﬁnance and growth revolve around entrepreneurship and either human capital accumulation
or technological progress. We adopt that perspective also.
3.1 Financial Intermediation and Growth
In the model of King and Levine (1993b) intermediaries are effectively venture capitalists that
have the technology necessary to screen potential entrepreneurs who are then employed and given
funds to run a research project. The fruit of such labour is an addition to the stock of knowledge
(speciﬁcally, via a quality-ladders setup ` a la Grossman and Helpman, 1991). The screening cost
is ﬁxed and the intermediary consequently knows with certainty the ability of the applicant. There
is no costly effort (so no moral hazard), and the intermediary market is perfectly competitive.
Reductions in the cost of screening or in the tax on intermediary proﬁts thus increase the efﬁciency
12of the ﬁnancial sector, increase the rate of technological progress and so increase the rate of long-
run growth. This process remains the core of our survey model; readers uninterested in the details
of the theory can safely skip to Section 3.1.7.
3.1.1 Outline
In this model ﬁrms demand physical capital and human capital. We have a continuum of agents
in each household of total mass one, and a random distribution of type within each. If we assume
a large number of households then in the aggregate we can work with the average distribution of
type within a given household. So, on average, a proportion ϕ1 has no ability to acquire human
capital whatsoever, a proportion ϕ2 has low ability Λ0 and the remainder, proportion ϕ3 = 1 −
ϕ1 − ϕ2 has high ability Λ > Λ0. It is important that able agents do not know their own level of
ability, only that they have some.7 Agents with no ability take household responsibility for selling
physical capital to ﬁrms. Only agents with high ability have the potential to develop human capital.
All agents with nonzero ability apply to a ﬁnancial intermediary to be screened. Those that are
rejected do not contribute to household income. Those that are accepted are consequently funded
by the intermediary to acquire education or conduct research, becoming human capital with ﬁxed
probability β. In the case of education this might reﬂect the likelihood of not dropping-out; in the
case of research this might reﬂect the probability of useful innovation. Those that fail to develop
human capital contribute nothing to household income, those that do develop human capital are
consequently employed by ﬁrms and enter the production function as human capital. In the event
that the agent succeeds in acquiring human capital it is the researcher that owns the human capital,
paying a proportion t of income from human capital to intermediaries. The intermediary thus sets
t to maximise expected proﬁts.
3.1.2 Firms
Firms use human capital, H, and physical capital, K, as inputs to the production process, Yt =
AKα
t H1−α
t . Each ﬁrm maximises proﬁts, πt = Yt − rKt − hHt, where each takes the rates
of return on physical capital, r, and human capital, h as given: r = α(Yt/Kt) and h = (1 −
7If agents knew their level of ability, given that the screening technology of the intermediary identiﬁes ability with
precision, and given also that agents know this, there would be no reason for those with less than high-ability to apply.
13α)(Yt/Ht). We can use equation for h to obtain the ﬁrm’s demand for human capital, Ht =
[(1−α)Yt]/h, which, upon substitution into the production function, obtains a form of the familiar











The intermediary incurs the cost f(H) > 0 to screen agents for ability and funds successful
applicants to acquire human capital at cost x(H) > 0. Note that these costs are not invariant to
the level of human capital, and we make the assumption that f0 > 0 and x0 > 0, i.e., that the costs
of intermediation are proportional to the size of the demand for human capital. So both the outlay
required to fund the acquisition of human capital, x, and the cost of screening candidate acquirers
of human capital, f, is increasing in the level of human capital – a reasonable assumption if we
imagine that the higher the level of human capital aspired to, the more costly it is to both fund
and identify suitably able agents. This ensures that the costs of intermediation do not become
insigniﬁcant over time as a proportion of the size of the economy.
There is an analogous requirement for balanced growth in a quality-ladders setup (see Trew,
2004) so it may be a general result that for balanced growth in these simple economies with static
ﬁnancial intermediation we require that the size of the ﬁnancial sector is constant over time. This
explains why, even though (because of data limitations) econometric analyses consider largely ﬁ-
nancial depth, most theory considers ﬁnancial efﬁciency; within an endogenous growth framework
it becomes difﬁcult to solve analytically for balanced growth when the size of the ﬁnancial sector
relative to the economy is changing over time. In an economy going through industrial transition,
the size of the ﬁnancial sector does change signiﬁcantly (see the discussion in section 2.1). It
may be that to reconcile these facts, i.e., for both the balanced growth rate and the level of ﬁnancial
depth to change endogenously over a period of industrial takeoff, we require the ﬁnancial condition
to be dynamic, instead of the static relationship depicted below.8
We also require that it is not feasible for households to fund the amount x(H) from their
own resources. For a given agent, expected intermediary proﬁts will be the probability-weighted
8Nolan et al. (Forthcoming) begins work in this direction.
14incomes and expenditures. The probability that an agent who applies will be of low ability is
ϕ2/(1 − ϕ1), in which case only the screening cost is expended. The probability of successfully
developing human capital from high-ability agents and thus obtaining a rent from him is β(1 −
ϕ1 − ϕ2)/(1 − ϕ2). If we assume competition then the expected intermediary proﬁt is zero,
E(π)=β

1 − ϕ1 − ϕ2
1 − ϕ1

[thH − x(H) − f(H)] +
+(1 − β)

1 − ϕ1 − ϕ2
1 − ϕ1







[−f(H)] = 0. (2)
If we specify x(H) = ηxhH and f(H) = ηfhH,9 where ηx > 0 and ηf > 0 are the cost pa-














Equation (3) is increasing in the costs of ﬁnancial intermediation, ηf and ηx, and in the share of
low ability agents, ϕ2, and decreasing in both the probability of human capital creation, β and the
share of high ability agents, ϕ3.
3.1.4 Households
The cost t∗hH is borne by consuming households. The household receives income from physical
and human capital, however, at the rates r and h respectively. Using equation (3), the household
budget constraint will thus be the familiar ct + ˙ kt = rk + τ(1 − t∗)hH. We mirror King and
Levine here by incorporating a tax on income from innovation, where 1 − τ is the tax rate applied
to household income from human capital. Households maximise the discounted present value of
9It is possible to generalise this functional form but the consequences for the model are not signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcally, we
can specify y(H) = ηyH, wherein we obtain t∗(h) and a less simple form for the interest rate. We prefer the former since
the problem becomes intractable when we consider the full model with moral hazard. As such, the simple model presented
here is entirely nested within its extension. It is not such an unreasonable assumption, however; the simplifying feature is









where u(ct) is the instantaneous utility function. If we assume CES preferences of the form
u(ct) = (c1−θ
t − 1)/(1 − θ), then we obtain the standard Euler equation governing the growth
rate of consumption, ˙ ct/ct = θ−1(r − ρ).
3.1.5 Equilibrium Growth
In equilibrium we require that the net return on capital is equal to the net return on human capital,











By the equilibrium ﬁnancial intermediation condition, h = r/[τ(1−t∗)], we may solve for r from,
r = A[τ(1 − α)(1 − t∗)]1−α. (6)





A[τ(1 − α)(1 − t∗)]1−α − ρ
	
. (7)
An increase in the efﬁciency of ﬁnancial intermediation, by reducing ηf or ηx ceteris paribus
results in an increase in the equilibrium growth rate by reducing the cost of intermediation, t∗. So
there is simply a wedge in between what ﬁrms pay for human capital and what agents receive,
where the signiﬁcance of this wedge reﬂects the efﬁciency of ﬁnancial intermediation. This is the
main theoretical result of King and Levine (1993b). Inasmuch as we can call exogenous changes
in ηf changes in ﬁnancial efﬁciency over time within a country we can now calibrate this model
and consider its quantitative implications for historical growth.
10This is akin to Tsiddon (1992)’s argument: “I assume that each ﬁnancial intermediary can provide a risk-free return
to lenders that is equal to or greater than the risk-free rate of return individuals can earn in the market for physical capital.
Competition guarantees that each ﬁnancial intermediary has zero proﬁt.” p. 305
163.1.6 Calibration
Using data from Crafts and Harley (1992) for the level of industrial production in the UK through
the industrial revolution we can, with reasonable parameter values, trace back the implied efﬁ-
ciency of ﬁnancial intermediation in this setup. We use here the ‘revised best guess’ (Crafts and
Harley, 1992, Table A3.I) for the industrial production series. This is a standard reference for such
data, and it shows a similar pattern to that in Bairoch (1982). The advantage of the Crafts and
Harley dataset is that they provide annual values. We do not extend the data to the current day
since the composition of output changed signiﬁcantly, with a decreasing proportion of industrial
production towards the end of the twentieth century. Figure 2 shows the path of the trend growth
rate. We report the growth rate of HP-ﬁltered series with both λ = 100 since this is annual data
and with λ = 10,000 to show the general movement in growth.11
Figure 2: Trend UK Growth of Industrial Production
Whichever of the two weights we use in the ﬁlter the implications are the same. Trend growth
in the UK increased through the early periods of industrial revolution and decreased slightly after
around 1825. This is a relatively typical pattern for countries going through industrialisation during
the eighteenth and nineteenth century, and the only exception seems to be the US.
11All data and results are available from the author.
17We can use the growth trend with λ = 10,000 to ﬁnd the implied value of ηf, ceteris paribus,
by using the estimate of trend growth, ˆ γ, and equations (3) and (7),
ˆ ηf =
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We must restrict some parameters for calibration purposes. For ˆ ηf > 0 over the range of ob-
vserved trend growth values we require A[(1 − ηx/β)(1 − α)]1−α >ˆ ¯ γθ + ρ, where ˆ ¯ γ is the max-
imum growth rate observed over the sample. Bearing this in mind we use the parameter values
given in Table 2 in simulations of this model.12
3.1.7 Numerical Implications
So we have inferred the historical level of ﬁnancial efﬁciency, in the King-Levine mould, as that
depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Historical Financial Efﬁciency in the UK
12These results are considerably robust to changes in parameters, so long as we obtain positive values for ηf. Without
signiﬁcantly altering the shape of the implied efﬁciency data over time we can vary α between 0.1 and 0.9, ϕ1 and ϕ2 can
take any value so long as ϕ1 +ϕ2 < 1, β can take any value in the interval (0,1), A can be varied widely (while satisfying
the inequality for ηf > 0), θ can be varied (again, so long as we satisfy the inequality), and ηx can take any positive value
below unity.
18Here we have inverted the y-axis in order to reﬂect more clearly the movement of implied ﬁnan-
cial efﬁciency over the period. Plainly there is a great deal of implied movement in the parameter
over time. We see an initially low level of ﬁnancial efﬁciency at the beginning of the industrial
take-off and a peak of ﬁnancial efﬁciency at around 1830. The parameter then falls monotoni-
cally over the remainder of the sample. The path of ﬁnancial efﬁciency mirrors the path of the
trend growth rate and so the implied drop in ﬁnancial efﬁciency reﬂects the fall in observed trend
growth.
It should be noted also that we are only changing one variable; the implied path of ﬁnancial
efﬁciency would be affected if we were to account for the technological revolution by exogenously
increasing A over the period. Nonetheless, the general shape of the path would remain. The
implication of this ﬁnance and growth model is thus that the level of ﬁnancial efﬁciency was,
at the start of the industrial revolution, (relatively) low. Financial efﬁciency then increased up
until around 1830 before dropping again, almost to pre-industrial levels.13 This observation is an
important one, and might be tested using appropriate historical data. In a sense it is surprising to
consider a rapid rise and then decline of ﬁnancial efﬁciency, and so this suggests that theories of
ﬁnance and growth, in the main, cannot acceptably account for the dynamics of industrial take-off.
Again, this question cannot move beyond speculation without further research.
3.2 Financial Intermediation, Moral Hazard and Growth
The degree to which the model presented in section 3.1 reﬂects the state of the literature is lim-
ited. Most work on ﬁnancial intermediation and growth considers some further role for asymmetric
information, be it imperfect screening, costly state-veriﬁcation or effort-aversion and costly mon-
itoring. Here we will take the latter approach, along the lines of de la De la Fuente and Mar´ ın
(1996) and Morales (2003).
In the King and Levine (1993b) model, the entrepreneur knows that there is no difference in
his income between success and failure, i.e., he is fully insured, and yet he still supplies effort in
the management of a research project, the success rate of which he has no inﬂuence over. In the
modiﬁcation presented in section 3.1, the agent is not fully insured (though of course the clan of
13The process could equally well be applied to any other country with sufﬁcient data; the growth patterns of many
industrialised countries have mirrored this peak shape, see Bairoch (1982).
19which he is part is fully diversiﬁed) but, still, he has no inﬂuence over the probability of acquiring
human capital. It is likely, however, that there would be a relationship between the effort the agent
puts into acquiring human capital and the likelihood, β, of it occurring. If agents are averse to
effort there emerges a role for intermediaries in implementing a costly monitoring technology,
where ‘monitoring’ is hereafter synonymous with ‘controlling’, to increase their expected income
by forcing an increase in β.
Morales (2003) considers an endogenous growth model with ﬁnancial imperfections but makes
the probability of innovation endogenous. Researchers in Morales’ model, analogous to the en-
trepreneurs of King and Levine, dislike effort and have limited liability, i.e., they pay back a certain
amount less than their monopoly proﬁts from starting up in the intermediate sector in the case of
success, but do not suffer relative to their initial wealth in the case of failure. So there is a level of
effort that the entrepreneur will provide given his preferences over effort. The intermediary then
has the ability to monitor the entrepreneur and force him to increase effort, a mechanism used in
a number of papers (inter alia De la Fuente and Mar´ ın, 1996; Blackburn and Hung, 1998). In the
model presented here an agent with high ability is funded and acquires human capital with proba-
bility β, paying back an amount to the intermediary in the case of success and nothing otherwise.
A simpleapproach is to assumethat agents are averseto effort and that amonitoring technology
is required to increase effort. Effort in this model is reﬂected in the probability of a good agent
becominghumancapital, soanincreaseineffortisthesameasanincreaseinβ, thoughnotone-for-
one. We could endogenise the quality of intermediary screening but for now we leave the simple
case where the agent and intermediary can only inﬂuence the probability of becoming human
capital.14 So, post-screening, the agent is faced with the following expected proﬁt condition,
β(1 − t∗)hH − D(β), (9)
where effort aversion enters as D(β) = (hHβ2)/(2κ), which is an increasing and convex function
of β, and also increasing in the level of human capital. The parameter κ > 0 reﬂects the agents’
effort aversion, i.e., high κ suggests a low aversion to effort. These assumptions might be justiﬁed
ontwocounts: Themarginaleffectofanincreaseineffortonthelikelihoodofsuccessisdecreasing
14Trew (2004a) considers such an extension in a model that is closer to King and Levine (1993b).
20in the probability of success; and the higher the level of human capital to which an agent aspires,
the more difﬁcult it is to succeed and so the higher the cost of increasing β. We also abstract from
taxation in this version, so τ = 1. The agent thus chooses his level of effort to maximise his private
return, given t∗ and κ,
β0 = κ(1 − t∗), (10)
which is, importantly, invariant to h.
We thus have a minimum effort level in the absence of monitoring equal to β0. An intermediary
can spend resources on ‘monitoring’ the agent in order to force his effort level higher. The cost of
increasingeffortisafunctionM(β−β0) = [hH(β−β0)2]/2softhedifferencebetweenthedesired
β and the minimum, β0, where s > 0 is, again, some scale parameter that inﬂuences the cost of
monitoring and we again assume that the cost of monitoring is increasing in the level of human
capital. So s is some indication of the sophistication of ﬁnancial intermediaries in mitigating
the costs of moral hazard; the higher is s, the less costly is moral hazard. These simplifying
assumptions are necessary for both β0 and β∗ to be invariant to H so they could be modiﬁed, but
the algebra would not permit a simple closed form solution for growth rates. We can deﬁne this
function to be convex in the difference between desired and minimum effort levels (the convexity
here is a consequence of convexity in effort-aversion). As such, the intermediary’s expected proﬁt
considers this additional cost,
E(π) = β





thH − x(H) − f(H) − [H(β − β0)2]/2s
	
+
+ (1 − β)

1 − ϕ1 − ϕ2
1 − ϕ1







[−f(H)] = 0. (11)
So the intermediary now maximises expected proﬁts with respect to both β and t. If we again
specify x(H) = ηxhH and f(H) = ηfhH, then the optimal β for a given t is the positive solution
to,
n
3β2 − 4βκ(1 − t) + [κ(1 − t)]
2
o









[κ(1 − t)]2 + 6st
	 1
2 . (13)
It is easy to see from equation (13) that both an increase in the efﬁciency of monitoring (increasing
the scale parameter s) and a lower aversion to effort (higher κ) results in a higher optimal effort.
Substituting the expression for the optimal β into the expected proﬁt function, equation (11),
and setting expected proﬁts equal to zero, it follows that the optimal levy on agents acquiring































































We can now ﬁnd the growth rate of the economy, as before, as a function of the ﬁnancial
intermediary conditions. It should be clear that parameterisation will not be as simple as in the
case without moral hazard since here we require both t∗ ∈ (0,1) and 0 < β0 < β∗ ∈ (0,1], but
there is a range of parameters for which we obtain sensible results.
Again we have r = (1 − t∗)h15 so the level of growth in the economy is equation (7). The
effect of parameter variations on growth are the opposite of the effect on the optimal t. For a
reasonable range of parameters16 it can be shown that the optimal ﬁnancial intermediary cost, t∗,
is decreasing in the efﬁciency of monitoring technology, s, and increasing the degree of effort
aversion (decreasing in κ). Financial efﬁciency also has the expected effect, with t∗ increasing in
both ηf and ηx.
So we have a model of endogenous growth which incorporates both the role of ﬁnancial efﬁ-
ciency, along the lines of King and Levine (1993b), and a facility to reﬂect the degree of moral
hazard faced, in the spirit of Morales (2003). It is, therefore, possible to consider the results from
section 3.1 in the light of changing moral hazard conditions over time.
We can also present an analogous result to that in Figure 3, with combinations of ﬁnancial
15This condition does not change from the model without moral hazard. Decisions over screening and effort are made
within the cohort of agents, before employment as human capital, so do not affect the conditions for dynamic optimisation.
16In these experiments the benchmark parameterisation is the same as that given in Table 2, and in addition κ = 1,
ηf = 0.1 and s = 10. We vary one parameter holding the others constant in order to infer the partial inﬂuences.
22efﬁciency and moral hazard required to obtain the observed UK growth path through the industrial
revolution. For each year we have an estimate of trend growth, ˆ γ, from which we can infer, from
equation (7), the implied estimate for t∗,
ˆ t∗ = 1 −







Again, there are restrictions on parameters in order that ˆ t∗ is in the unit interval. Speciﬁcally this
requires that 0 < θˆ γ + ρ < A(1 − α)1−α, so we choose parameter values that satisfy this given
the range of growth rates over the period 1701-1913.17 Using parameter values given in Table 3,
this inequality is satisﬁed for the entire sample. The fact that we can use the same parameters
for both models demonstrates that the model without moral hazard is nested within the extended
model presented here, and also that both are not overly sensitive to parameter variations.
Having identiﬁed ˆ t∗ we can ﬁnd combinations of ﬁnancial costs, ηf, and s that obtain this
growth rate using equation (14), and thus combinations of ﬁnancial efﬁciency and moral hazard
that replicate the industrial revolution in the UK. Figure 4 depicts this relationship, where we
again simply reverse the z-axis to give an impression of ﬁnancial efﬁciency ` a la King and Levine
(1993b). As anticipated, improving moral hazard conditions (increasing s) means that, ceteris
paribus, a given level of growth can be obtained with lower ﬁnancial efﬁciency.
Figure 4 gives combinations of ﬁnancial efﬁciency and moral hazard that result in our estimated
growth rate. We can see that either high ﬁnancial efﬁciency and high moral hazard costs or low
ﬁnancial efﬁciency and low moral hazard costs obtain the same growth rate, as in Morales (2003).
We can imagine a cross-section of the ﬁgure as being equivalent to Figure 3.18 So changes in the
conditions of moral hazard affect the level of ﬁnancial efﬁciency required to obtain a given growth
rate.
The relation between growth and ﬁnancial efﬁciency is monotonic but the degree of variation
is clearly dependent on the relationship between the rate of growth and moral hazard conditions.
Choosingacrosssectionats = 2suggestsahighlevelofﬁnancialefﬁciencythroughouttheperiod,
while at s = 8 we see a (relatively) more dramatic variation in the level of ﬁnancial efﬁciency. So
17The minimum growth rate, using the same procedure as in section 3.1, is 0.47% and the maximum is 3.60%
18We cannot think about a single cross-section as representing it perfectly since, in that model, β is ﬁxed whereas here
it is endogenous and so changing over the period, but the general pattern is consistent.
23Figure 4: Industrial Growth, Moral Hazard and Financial Efﬁciency












where γ > γ (16)
i.e. the partial effect of s on ηf is more negative (closer to zero) when growth is low (high). So the
most unusual implication of the ﬁgure is that as moral hazard conditions deteriorate, so ﬁnancial
efﬁciency needs to vary less in order to obtain equal changes in the growth rate. It will help our
understanding of the model if we consider the intermediary’s total spend on monitoring.
Interestingly, the total spend on monitoring, M(β∗ − β0), is almost invariant to s, as shown
in Figure 5. The minimum effort level, β0, is invariant to s but the optimal effort level, β∗ is of
course increasing in s while the overall monitoring cost simultaneously declines. So increases
in the efﬁciency with which intermediaries can monitor agents endogenously decreases the level
of moral hazard in intermediation without intermediaries actually spending signiﬁcantly different
amounts on monitoring agents.
The reason why total monitoring spend falls as growth increases is because of the implied
increase in ﬁnancial efﬁciency, decreasing the optimal intermediation levy, t∗, and so increasing
24Figure 5: Industrial Growth and Spend on Monitoring
the minimum effort level, β0. This causes less emphasis to be placed on the the effect of monitoring
on growth. As such, we observe that at high growth rates, when the minimum effort level is
high and with roughly constant and, most importantly, low spend on monitoring, the effect of
changing moral hazard conditions is less since it enters directly into the monitoring decision. The
transmission from moral hazard to growth thus follows: When moral hazard conditions mean that
the level of effort in the absence of monitoring is low the total spend on monitoring is high and so,
in such cases, the effect of changing moral hazard conditions affects growth more severely.
This sort of result, where moral hazard and economic growth conditions interact, is akin to that
in Greenwood and Smith (1997) and Blackburn et al. (2005) and, in the simple form presented
here, could be tested empirically with appropriate cliometric evidence.
This section has presented a way of generalising the contemporary approach to ﬁnance and
growth theory, and has demonstrated that such models can have quantitative, and therefore testable,
results. The purpose of the rest of this paper is to consider the scope for such testing, as well as
looking at the general implications of the current literature from an historical perspective.
254 Discussion
We have seen that the ﬁnance-growth nexus operates along at least four dimensions: The size of
the ﬁnancial sector as a proportion of the economy (ﬁnancial depth); the effect of institutions and
regulations on the efﬁciency with which ﬁnancial services are provided (ﬁnancial efﬁciency); the
nature and extent of asymmetric information (both moral hazard and adverse selection); and the
extent of disaggregation. In addition, each of these are evolving over time. Viewed from this
perspective, the literatures surveyed in this paper typically address the ﬁnance-growth nexus in an
incomplete way.
It has been shown that applied econometric work considers ﬁnancial depth while holding efﬁ-
ciency to be exogenous. By contrast, most theories consider ﬁnancial efﬁciency holding depth to
be constant. This clear disconnection has signiﬁcant implications for the reconciliation of applied
and theoretical work: Applied (theoretical) research of this sort cannot without qualiﬁcation be
held to support theoretical (applied) conclusions.
Quite apart from the mapping between the theory and empirics of ﬁnance and growth, there
has been little in the way of historical motivation or cliometric testing in the standard approach to
most theoretical modelling. Section 3 has demonstrated that most theories consider asymmetric
information and ﬁnancial efﬁciency but pay little heed to questions of disaggregation; there is no
scope for sub-national coalitions of ﬁnancial intermediaries to provide services more efﬁciently.
The time-series historical analysis based on ﬁnancial depth have demonstrated clear and con-
sistent results that supplement what was learned from the cross-sectional research. This literature
tells us that the level of ﬁnancial depth does change over time, and that theories of static interme-
diation thus miss an important element of the story which robust econometric analyses suggest is
so important. But in terms of understanding why ﬁnancial depth leads economic growth we need
to understand the reasons why ﬁnancial structures emerge. Economic theory justiﬁes the existence
of banks, or more generally coalitions of agents who provide ﬁnance, by appealing to asymmetric
information. It is necessary, if we are to endogenise the ﬁnancial development of an economy
going through industrial transition, to consider historical experience in this light.
Instead of appealing to such historical beacons, decisions about modelling are typically driven
by cross-section evidence in a way that limits the time-series implications of the theory, i.e., there
26are few meaningful transitional dynamics.19 A major drawback with present theory is that, even if
we can back out some indicative path for ﬁnancial efﬁciency, this transition would be exogenous
and, as suggested by Section 3, perhaps even counterfactual. We must look properly at the histori-
cal record in order to understand the mechanics behind the degree of asymmetric information, and
in this way develop a theory of endogenous growth and endogenous ﬁnancial development.20
The historical evidence presented in Section 2 suggests that the relationship between agents and
ﬁnancial intermediaries is dynamic and disaggregated, and where the level of ﬁnancial depth is not
constant. The mechanics of theories such as King and Levine (1993b) appear, prima facie, to be
difﬁcult to square with with the historical evidence presented here. The numerical implications of
these models raise further questions since are also difﬁcult to reconcile with the historical literature.
In general, the static approach to modelling ﬁnance and growth in which ﬁnancial depth is not
endogenously changing and where aggregative factors are not considered, is thus inappropriate
and the implications of the models described in Section 3 must be considered with caution.
The problem is in establishing the quantitative signiﬁcance of each of these aspects. If we can
work towards uncovering the richness of the dynamic interplay between asymmetric information,
ﬁnancial structure, ﬁnancial depth and economic growth, during the transition to an industrial
economy, thenwewouldhaveanew, morehistoricallycongruent, micro-founded, theoryofﬁnance
and growth. Townsend and Ueda (2006) is an interesting start to work in this direction, matching
rich, disaggregated data on Thailand to a theory of inequality, ﬁnancial deepening and growth.
But a step further than this would be to consider a long time series of a country incorporating the
pre-industrial, take-off, and post-industrial phases of development with an understanding of the
morphing ﬁnancial depth, ﬁnancial efﬁciency, asymmetric information and aggregation issues all
coming into play.
5 Conclusions
Applied and theoretical research on any question in economics cannot be considered in isolation
from each other. We have argued that the theoretical, contemporary econometric and historical
19A clear exception is the work of Townsend and Ueda (2006).
20Nolan et al. (Forthcoming) begins work in this direction.
27literatures on the ﬁnance-growth nexus are if not contradictory then at best simply disconnected.
An attempt at reconciliation will need to move beyond the concentration on contemporary econo-
metrics, beyond the assumption of static information asymmetry, and beyond the conception of
aggregate variables alone.
These criticisms apply equally to empirical, theoretical and historical research. Future work
will thus need to identify the key features of the interaction between ﬁnance and growth over con-
tinuous periods, such as the industrial revolution. The historical literature surveyed brieﬂy here
strongly suggests that current theories of ﬁnance and growth do not depict adequately the expe-
riences of countries going through industrial revolution. A potentially more fruitful avenue for
research will be to establish the historical experience of industrialisation, asymmetric information
and intermediation, and then construct a growth theory founded in microeconomics that more faith-
fully reﬂects it. Understanding the relationship between increasing ﬁnancial depth and evolving
conditions of asymmetric information through a period of industrial revolution is required as a ﬁrst
step.
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32Table 2: Parameter Values for the Representative Model
capital share α 0.67
subjective discount rate ρ 0.02
elasticity of substitution θ 5
human capital probability β 0.75
proportion of zero ability ϕ1 0.4
proportion of low ability ϕ2 0.2
coefﬁcient of technological progress A 30
scale parameter on ﬁnancial investment ηx 0.01
tax parameter τ 1
Table 3: Benchmark Calibration for the Model with Moral Hazard
capital share α 0.67
subjective discount rate ρ 0.02
elasticity of substitution θ 5
proportion of zero ability ϕ1 0.4
proportion of low ability ϕ2 0.2
coefﬁcient of technological progress A 30
scale parameter on ﬁnancial investment ηx 0.01
scale parameter on screening ηf 0.1
effort aversion parameter κ 1
monitoring cost parameter s 10
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